Children\u27s Voice and Justice: Lawyering for Children in the Twenty-First Century by Appell, Annette R.
CHILDREN'S VOICE AND JUSTICE:
LAWYERING FOR CHILDREN IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Annette R. Appell*
I. INTRODUCTION
Although children in the United States have been subject to public regula-
tion and protection since colonial times, during the twentieth century notions of
children as autonomous and as rights holders who are entitled to "justice" have
become pervasive. States have created specialized juvenile and family courts;
large federal and state entities exist to aid in the protection, education, and
control of children; the Supreme Court has extended many constitutional rights
to youth, including the right to counsel in juvenile justice proceedings;' and
Congress has required states receiving child welfare funding to appoint repre-
sentatives for children subject to child abuse or neglect proceedings.2 As a
result, minors are widely understood to have both substantive and procedural
rights and interests and, accordingly, they receive legal representation in a
number of legal proceedings involving children's rights and interests.
It is far from clear, however, whether these notions of justice and rights,
and the corresponding creation and growth of a children's attorney bar, have
promoted children's objectives or made their worlds more just. On the con-
trary, children have fared poorly in the five or six decades since they were
acknowledged to be constitutional rights-holders in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion3 and entitled to due process protections against certain coercive state
action in In re Gault.4 The United States has one of the highest poverty rates
among children of the western, industrialized world, and child poverty here has
actually increased by more than fifty percent in the past quarter century. 5 We
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In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
2 Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5106a (b)(2)(A) (2000 & Supp.
2003).
3 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
5 LEE RAINWATER & TIMOTHY M. SMEEDING, POOR KIDS IN A RICH COUNTRY 22, 29
(2003). Indeed, poverty among children increased from fourteen to twenty-one percent
between 1969 and 1990. Paul E. Peterson, An Immodest Proposal, 121 DAEDALUS 151, 153
(1992).
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subject our children to extreme surveillance in their schools and elsewhere,6
and suspend and expel them from school at alarming rates.7 It is not surprising
then that schools have become a track to incarceration8 and the United States,
one of only four countries that sentences persons to life for crimes they com-
mitted while minors, has over 2,000 people serving such time.9
Moreover, by virtue of their diversity and developmental spectrum, chil-
dren do not have strong voices in matters of policy, and even in matters regard-
ing their own legal interests. Thus policy makers and children's lawyers are
particularly unfettered to promote law and outcomes in the name of children
that, in fact, may be unresponsive or even hostile to them, their families, and
their communities.'" Indeed, a war against youth seems to have replaced our
failed War on Poverty 1 as we make policy choices that either target youth or,
through neglect, diminish their opportunities.12
6 See Bernardine Dohrn, Look Out Kid/It's Something You Did: Zero Tolerance for Chil-
dren, in ZERO TOLERANCE 89, 95 (William Ayers, Bernardine Dohrn, & Rick Ayers eds.,
2001) (describing closed campus schools with "metal detectors, locker and backpack
searches, contraband, interrogations and informers, heavily armed tactical police patrols, sur-
veillance cameras, [and] uniforms"); Linda S. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith, Demonizing
Youth, 35 Lov. L.A. L. REV. 747, 759-63 (2001) (discussing punitive statutes that label
youth as gang members, contain few safeguards against wrongful identification, and make
gang membership a crime or grounds to enhance a crime; and describing police data bases of
gang members).
7 The number of students pushed out of schools through suspensions has increased from 1.7
million in 1974 to 3.1 million in 2000. Monique Dixon, Combating the Schoolhouse-to-
Jailhouse Track Through Community Lawyering, 39 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 135, 136 (2005);
see also, ZERO TOLERANCE, supra note 6 (collecting a series of essays regarding school
discipline, and criminalization, of youth). School discipline is disproportionately meted out
to students of color. Dixon, supra, at 137.
8 See, e.g., Dixon, supra note 7, at 135-137 (rehearsing anecdotal instances involving young
children and statistics showing a large increase in arrests for student misconduct, despite a
significant decrease in violent crimes by students).
I Adam Liptak, Locked Away Forever After Crimes as Teenagers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2005,
at A-I (citing October 12, 2005, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International Report,
and noting that the other three countries have a mere handful of persons serving those
sentences). Child and anti-capital punishment advocates were able to convince the Supreme
Court to outlaw the death penalty for children who committed crimes under the age of eigh-
teen. Roper v. Simmons, 546 U.S. 551 (2005).
10 See Annette R. Appell, Disposable Mothers, Deployable Children, 9 MICH. J. RACE & L.
421, 442-64 (2004) (discussing adoption and child protective policy and practice in the name
of children); Dorothy Roberts, The Community Dimension of State Child Protection, 34 HoF-
STRA L. REV. 23 (2005).
11 See LAWRENCE GROSSBERG, CAUGHT IN THE CROSSFIRE, KIDS, POLITICS, AND AMERICA'S
FUTURE 15-74 (2005) (describing this war); Beres & Griffith, supra note 6, at 747-50 (illus-
trating that the War on Drugs and California Proposition 21 have transformed police officers
into warriors, utilizing paramilitary mind-sets and techniques against gangs). For a collec-
tion of studies regarding our racialized abandonment and demonization of youth, and poor
youth of color especially, see ZERO TOLERANCE, supra note 6.
12 See GROSSBERG, supra note 11, at 175-189, 235-37, 251-52, 259-60, 271 (discussing the
failure to invest in the future, including social and economic programs for children); Martha
Minow, Children's Rights: Where We've Been, and Where We're Going, 68 TEMPLE L.
REV. 1573 (1995) (noting backlash regarding children's rights); Nancy Scheper-Hughes &
Carolyn Sargent, Introduction, in SMALL WARS: THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF CHILDHOOD 28
(Nancy Scheper-Hughes & Carolyn Sargent eds., 1998) (noting with alarm the recent
proliferation of child-hostile public policies in the United States).
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Motivated in part by these paradoxes between increased rights and
decreased welfare, in 1995, a group of children's advocates, legal ethicists, and
other academics convened for the Fordham Conference on Ethical Issues in the
Legal Representation of Children ("Fordham Children's Conference"). 3 That
Conference forged consensus among leading members of the children's bench
and bar that children, not attorneys, should direct the objectives and scope of
legal representation.' 4 This norm was grounded in the ethical rules governing
attorneys and sent an important message that children should have voice in
legal proceedings affecting their lives and their rights: that children are moral
beings whose volition matters.
Ten years after that important conference and despite its clarity and depth,
children's attorneys continue to grapple with a number of questions, including
the ongoing struggle to meet the norm of client directed lawyering for chil-
dren 5 and the challenges of ethically representing children as autonomous
beings who are deeply embedded in, and still being formed by, their families
and communities.' 6 The 2006 UNLV Conference on Representing Children in
Families: Child Advocacy and Justice Ten Years After Fordham ("UNLV Chil-
dren's Conference") aimed to take the next step in answering these and other
questions. This paper contributes to this discussion by establishing a frame-
work for exploring the relationships between children's advocacy and justice.
It acknowledges that despite our good intentions, if we children's attorneys are
not mindful we can idealize children and subordinate their specific wishes and
identities to our own notions of what is good for them. Moreover, children's
attorneys play a dominant role in defining and making policy regarding chil-
dren's rights and needs. Yet it is not clear why or how attorneys, rather than
children's families and communities, are well-suited to make these
determinations.
This paper rests on the belief that although children's lawyers do what we
do to help children, the natural dominance and myopia of lawyers is exacer-
bated when representing children in ways that can easily mask children's dispa-
rate identities, needs, and desires. These specifics-identity, desire, need-
constitute part of what I mean by "children's voice." For children, like adults,
but perhaps more so, are complex, multi-relational, and changing; and children
13 Bruce A. Green & Bernardine Dohrn, Foreword: Children and the Ethical Practice of
Law, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1281, 1284-86 (1996).
" Recommendations of the Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of
Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1301 (1996).
"S Jean Koh Peters, How Children Are Heard in Child Protective Proceedings, in the United
States and Around the World in 2005: Survey Findings, Initial Observations, and Areas for
Further Study, 6 NEV. L.J. 966 (2006).
16 This is a particularly pressing question because representing children can isolate them
from, and even pit them against, their families and communities. See Janet E. Ainsworth,
Youth Justice in a Unified Court: Response to Critics of Juvenile Court Abolition, 36 B.C.
L. REV. 927, 935 (1995) (noting that since Gault, the juvenile courts have increasingly aban-
doned their rehabilitative mission in favor of a retributive approach); Annette R. Appell,
Uneasy Tensions Between Children's Rights and Civil Rights, 5 NEV. L.J. 141 (2004) (illus-
trating how advocating for children's dependency rights can separate children from their
families and communities); Martin Guggenheim, How Children's Lawyers Serve State Inter-
ests, 6 NEV. L.J. 805 (2006) (offering examples of children's attorneys in child protection
cases presuming conflict between parent and child).
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are, in many cases, less articulate and less able to understand and say what they
mean. Because children are not able to direct their lawyers as forcefully or
coherently as adults, lawyers for children should exercise extra care and special
strategies to ascertain children's needs and wishes, such as viewing children in
multiple lenses (not just "developmental" and legal) and engaging children's
families and communities in our work. The next section provides a conceptual
framework for child advocacy and justice, dividing, and briefly assessing, the
ways in which we seek justice for children at any given time or in any given
setting into three approaches to justice: procedural, legal and social. The final
section explores what it might mean to represent children in families, which for
me means representing children in context and in their individuality: a manner
of advocacy in which children can have voice both in legal proceedings to
which they are parties and in defining justice. The primary aim of this paper is
to challenge myself and other child advocates to oppose essentialized and ideal-
ized views of children and instead hear, and find meaning in, each child's
voice. These challenges require us to cabin our professional expertise and life
experiences so that we can view children in their complexity, variety, contexts,
and uniqueness.
II. CHILD ADVOCACY AND JUSTICE
I cannot say with empirical certainty that children's lawyers are motivated
to do good 7 but based on my extensive experience over nearly two decades
with attorneys who represent children, it is clear that most of us do so to help
children-individually or as a group. Approaches to "helping children" seem
to range from: protecting children from their parents, themselves, or the
state; 8 to giving children voice; 9 to empowering children;2" and to improving
" See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Causes of Cause Lawyering: Toward an Understand-
ing of the Motivation and Commitment of Social Justice Lawyers, in CAUSE LAWYERING:
POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 31, 33 (Austin Sarat & Stu-
art Scheingold eds., 1998) [hereinafter CAUSE LAWYERING] (discussing what is meant by
altruistic lawyering). Based on two decades of studying public interest lawyers, Professors
Scheingold and Sarat find "political or moral commitment an essential and distinguishing
feature of... [such] lawyering." STUART A. SCHEINGOLD & AUSTIN SARAT, SOMETHING TO
BELIEVE IN, POLITICS: PROFESSIONALISM, AND CAUSE LAWYERING 4 (2004).
18 This may be the approach of attorneys who represent children in custody, child protec-
tive, contested adoptions, domestic violence, juvenile justice, or education matters.
19 This may include those attorneys who seek to give children voice in the proceedings
mentioned in the preceding note. See also Peter Margulies, The Lawyer as Caregiver: Child
Client's Competence in Context, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1473, 1476 (1996); Catherine J. Ross,
From Vulnerability to Voice: Appointing Counsel for Children in Civil Litigation, 64 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 1571 (1996).
20 Katherine Hunt Federle, The Ethics of Empowerment: Rethinking the Role of Lawyers in
Interviewing and Counseling the Child Client, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1655 (1996). Empow-
erment could also include creating more procedural rights for children. Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse, Enhancing Children's Participation in Policy Formation, 45 Amz. L. REV 751
(2003) (focusing on "child-centered" approaches includes integrating children's voices into
law and policy formation through a number of methods including: appointed counsel, child-
friendly courtrooms and evidentiary standards).
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the systems that purport to serve children.2 ' Other attorneys may seek to
improve the material conditions in which children live, but it appears that they
do so outside of an attorney-child-client relationship.22 All in all, we are a
passionate bunch who seek to do justice for children.
Justice, however, is one of those capacious terms that, to compound its
many meanings and uses, falls easily off the tongue and keyboard but is rarely
defined. 23 Lawyers for children may each, or as a group, have multiple, and
perhaps conflicting notions of justice. Most child advocates probably seek pro-
cedural justice for children; here the idea is to make sure children have a voice
in proceedings where their rights are at issue.2 4 Other notions of justice are
more substantive-the desire to create or extend substantive rights for chil-
dren-to achieve legal justice for children.2 5 Other lawyers may take notions
of justice even further to the area of distributive justice-of improving the
material conditions in which children live by eradicating socio-economic struc-
tures that present the largest risk factors children face-to achieve social justice
for children.26 Any particular lawyer or law office may seek justice in any or
21 E.g., Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law; Children's Inc.; National Center for Youth
Law; Juvenile Law Center; see also Casey Trupin & Richard A. Wayman, From Street
Lawyering to Systemic Lawyering: Meeting the Basic Needs of Unaccompanied and Home-
less Youth Through Systemic Legal Advocacy, 39 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 177 (2005). This
category surely includes the individual litigation that children's attorneys conduct in child
protection, education and juvenile justice proceedings.
22 Children's Defense Fund, www.childrensdefense.org (last visited May 16, 2006); Center
for Law in the Public Interest in Los Angeles, California, www.clipi.org (last visited May
16, 2006). This is not to suggest that children's attorneys do not engage in such advocacy in
addition to providing direct or class representation to children. E.g., JUDGE DAVID F.
BAZELON CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, MAKING CHILD WELFARE WORK (1998).
Children's attorneys also collaborate with social and medical service providers who provide
assistance to the non-legal needs of children and their families. E.g., University of Connecti-
cut School of Law Kid's Counsel Center for Children's Advocacy, http://www.kidscounsel.
org/programs.htm (last visited May 16, 2006); Martha Stone, Stacey Violante Cote,
Christina Ghio, Ann-Marie DeGraffenreidt, Center for Children's Advocacy: Providing
Holistic Legal Services to Children in Their Communities, 39 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 244
(2005).
23 See Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, Legal Justice and Injustice: Toward a Situated
Perspective, in JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE IN LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 1 (Austin Sarat &
Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1996) (discussing the absence, and futility of attempts to develop,
universal accounts of justice).
24 For example, this approach might refer to children's attorneys in their capacity of defend-
ing children in child welfare and juvenile justice proceedings.
25 E.g., Marcia Lowry, Derring-Do in the 1980s: Child Welfare Impact Litigation After the
Warren Years, 20 FAM. L. Q. 255 (1986) (describing constitutional rights litigation); Suellyn
Scarnecchia, A Child's Right to Protection from Transfer Trauma in a Contested Adoption
Case, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 41, 45-46 (1995) (arguing for legal protection of
existing relationships with non-biological parents).
26 The Children's Defense Fund may be the most well-known entity that takes a relatively
distributive approach. Of course there are many types of justice, some of which may be
applicable to advocacy for youth. See, e.g., PENDA D. HAIR, LOUDER THAN WORDS: LAW-
YERS, COMMUNITIES AND THE STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE (2001) (defining and describing racial
justice community lawyering); Susan Brooks, Representing Children in Families, 6 NEV.
L.J. 724 (2006) (advocating therapeutic and preventive justice approaches to representing
children); Cheryl Graves, Donyelle Gray, & Ora Schub, Making the Case for Restorative
Justice, 39 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 219 (2005) (discussing the utility of community-based
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all three of these senses. I discuss them, however, as conceptually discrete
models and weigh each approach's relationship to children's voice in exper-
iencing and defining justice to help illuminate, and promote self-reflection
regarding, what children's lawyers do.
A. Procedural Justice Approach
Under the procedural justice approach, lawyers represent children's objec-
tives in legal settings. This approach concerns itself with protecting or prose-
cuting children's rights under the law and does not involve political action such
as changing or creating law.27 Instead, legal representation is an end in itself.2 8
This approach aims to provide legal representation to promote legal interests,
and fairness in application and implementation of the law,2 9 and to promote
children's voice.3 ° Here, the lawyer advances the client's individual objectives
without undue regard to the interests of others.3 This approach does not aim
for substantive change because these lawyers seek primarily to provide access
to the justice system without challenging that system itself.32 Of course, hold-
ing persons or institutions to the law's mandates can itself be transformative,
particularly when courts or other governmental institutions have ignored chil-
dren' s legal rights.33 In any event, lawyers seeking procedural justice, by defi-
nition, confine themselves to relatively narrow legal advocacy, rather than
political or social action in which the lawyers might aim to change policy or
shape social responses and strategies.
A procedural justice approach to representing children, for better and for
worse, cabins children's lawyers in at least three ways. First, as noted above,
children's procedural justice lawyers attend to legal rights, rather than political
or social change. Thus, there is less likelihood that attorneys will subordinate
restorative justice for disputes regarding juveniles delinquency charges, schools and teen
dating violence); Marcheta Lee Gillam, Steven Fischbach, & Ralph Scott, Poisoned by Pov-
erty: A Call to Improve Health Outcomes for Low-Income and Minority Children, 39
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 4 (2005) (urging child advocates to incorporate environmental justice
approaches into their work).
27 See Thomas M. Hilbink, You Know the Type...: Categories of Cause Lawyering, 29
LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 657, 665-73 (2004) (describing "proceduralist lawyering" as a basic
commitment to providing legal representation to persons within the legal system, in contrast
to trying to change the system).
28 Id. at 668; See also Ross, supra note 19, at 1571 (arguing that particularly because of
their vulnerabilities and to protect their interests, children should have appointed counsel in
civil proceedings); Abbe Smith, Too Much Heart and Not Enough Heat: The Short Life and
Fractured Ego of the Empathic, Heroic Public Defender, 37 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 1203,
1208-10 (2004) (describing public defenders' faith in adversary system and their motivation
to protect substantive and procedural liberties).
29 Hilbink, supra note 27, at 668.
30 Lewis Pitts, Fighting for Children's Rights: Lessons from the Civil Rights Movement, 16
U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 337, 347 (2005); Ross, supra note 19; U.N Convention on the
Rights of the Child, Article 12, 28 I.L.M. 1448, 1461 (1989).
3' Hilbink, supra note 27, at 672.
32 See Pitts, supra note 30, at 347-50 (claiming children's procedural rights should not be
confused with, or affect, substantive law governing the proceedings).
33 See Hilbink, supra note 27, at 669 (acknowledging that even "proceduralist lawyers"
challenge the status quo when they seek to enforce their clients previously disregarded
rights).
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their clients' interests to larger systemic goals.34 Moreover, they do not seek
changes in the substantive law based on their own or their clients' notions of
what the law should be. Second, and relatedly, procedural justice lawyers
advocate in the context of existing rights, protecting their clients' legal interests
and, perhaps, the related social and legal consequences of the client's choice.
These lawyers may be less likely to see their clients as members of larger com-
munities, identify the systemic legal and social issues that affect the child's life
and choices, or assess the substantive justice of the legal system in which the
attorney is advocating.35 In other words, this procedural justice approach may
have limitations attendant to viewing children in terms of their legal problems
and legal solutions; this view can inhibit identification of, and solutions to,
problems that are grounded in larger socio-economic structures. Third, proce-
dural justice lawyers tend to be the most traditional in their approach to lawyer-
ing so they are less likely to deviate from professional norms;36 this fidelity
might inhibit them from reaching out to parents and others who might be seen
to have interests that conflict with the child client's.
These limitations reveal both weaknesses and strengths regarding identify-
ing and promoting children's voice. The procedural justice approach confines
the lawyer to enforce the child's rights even if the underlying law is not particu-
larly just-or more accurately, does not meet the attorney's (or child's) notion
of justice.3 7 This approach can also limit the attorney to viewing and listening
to the client in the context of an individual with a legal problem, rather than in
the child's own frame. Thus, the attorney may not engage with the child to
identify other options, needs or interests that the child may have. Nor may the
attorney look beyond his or her individual client to those to whom the child
looks to for care and identity, such as family and community members and
norms.
Yet these limitations are also positive because child clients, even more
than adult clients, are often inhibited from forcefully directing the lawyer.38
Although children have definite ideas-even at very young ages-about fair-
ness and justice,39 their ability to form ideas about policy is either limited or,
more likely, easily discounted, and so it is more vulnerable to subordination
even by their own attorneys.4 ° Representing children under the procedural jus-
tice approach does not require answers to these larger questions; instead, the
3 See infra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
3 Guggenheim, supra note 16, at 326-27, 829-30; Hilbink supra note 27, at 672.
36 Hilbink, supra note 27, at 668, 672.
37 See Guggenheim, supra note 16 (suggesting that even procedural justice lawyers insert
their own or other's visions of substantive rights into representation of children in child
welfare proceedings).
38 Emily Buss, "You're My What?" The Problem of Children's Misperceptions of Their
Lawyers' Roles, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1699 (1996); Martin Guggenheim, Representing Chil-
dren in Child Protective Proceedings: Ethical and Practical Dimensions, 97 MICH. L. REV.
1488, 1495-96 (1999) (book review).
39 See BERRY MAYALL, TOWARDS A SOCIOLOGY FOR CHILDHOOD: THINKING FROM CHIL-
DREN'S LIVEs 21, 88-90 (2002).
40 These risks are not confined to children. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters:
Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470
(1976); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes
on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFFALO L. REV. 1, 4 (1990).
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procedural justice lawyer seeks more cabined and concrete information and
direction from the child: what does the child want in this particular matter;
what does he or she think is the just outcome in this case. The discreteness and
concreteness of this inquiry, as opposed to more complex and abstract ques-
tions regarding justice, may, in fact, better elicit the child's voice because the
child can speak more forcefully and knowingly about his or her own life. Thus,
ethically representing children's existing legal interests defers determinations
of what is just for children as a group to more democratic and public fora than
the attorney-client relationship and concerns itself instead with what is just for
the child in question.4 In these ways, the procedural justice approach narrows
the child's voice in ways that are both limiting and empowering for the child.
B. Legal Justice Approach
The more substantive legal justice approach to lawyering for children
seeks to enlarge children's positive rights and liberties, or the duties of others
toward children.42 This approach includes lawyers who aim to promote change
through expanding, challenging or changing substantive law.43 Here lawyers
advocate to increase their clients' rights and benefits within our current legal
system. Thus legal justice lawyers may litigate matters to push the boundaries
of children's constitutional rights," or engage in policy-making, often in the
form of legislation, that will create or enlarge children's rights.4 5 Unlike the
procedural justice approach, this one expands the lawyer's role to the political
41 Cf. Martin Guggenheim, Reconsidering the Need for Counsel for Children in Custody,
Visitation and Child Protection Proceedings, 29 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 299, 300-01 (1998) (illus-
trating how the attorney's views regarding justice can determine how she interprets the law
or her role).
42 For thoughtful discussions of the nature of children's rights, see, e.g., DAVID ARCHARD,
CHILDREN: RicrHTs AND CHILDHOOD 55-56 (2d ed. 2004) (identifying liberty fights, welfare
rights, and children's fights); Harry Brighouse, How Should Children be Heard?, 45 ARIZ.
L. REV. 691, 701-03 (2003) (identifying welfare rights which refer to duties adults owe
toward a child's well-being; and agency rights, which include the fight to act on one's own
judgment); Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.
REV. 1860, 1867 (1987) (discussing rights as expressions of claims used to persuade others
about how one should be treated); Michael S. Wald, Children's Rights: A Framework for
Analysis, 12 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 255 (1979) (identifying children's social, protective, adult,
and family fights).
" See Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of Affirma-
tive Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436 (2005); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Iden-
tity-Based Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419 (2001); Edward L.
Rubin, Passing Through the Door: Social Movement Literature and Legal Scholarship, 150
U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2001); Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and the Repro-
duction of Professional Authority, in CAUSE LAWYERING, supra note 17, at 3, 4.
44 E.g., Brown v Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Bellotti
v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431
U.S. 816 (1977); Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
45 E.g., Education for All Handicapped Children Act, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773
(1975) (now amended and known as the Individual with Disabilities Education Act, Pub. L.
No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1141 (1990), as amended in 2004); Interethnic Adoption Act, Passed
as Section 1808 of the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996., Pub. L. No. 104-188
§ 1808, 110 Stat. 1755, 1903-04 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 671, 674, 1996); but see
Beth A. Ferri & David J. Connor, Special Education and the Subverting of Brown, 8 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 57 (2004) (tying over-representation of minorities in special educa-
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arena 46 and has the potential to enlarge the child's substantive rights and thus
expand possibilities of substantive justice for children.
The strengths of this approach are that it can promote children's interests
in a variety of areas in which their interests are subsumed within family or
state, or are simply disregarded because children have little actual and political
power. Through legal justice approaches, law can be a mechanism both for
increasing rights47 and challenging laws that serve as markers of subordination
and inferiority.4 8 Children's liberationists of the 1960s and 1970s called for
extension of adult civil liberties to children, including the right to vote, work
and make education decisions. 49 Although not all of these calls were heeded,
children certainly have gained important freedoms through legal justice
approaches.5 ° These victories include limited speech and privacy liberties, 5'
and the right to equal protection52 and procedural due process.53
Weaknesses in this approach's ability to identify and effect children's
voice are three-fold. First, as suggested above, legal justice relies on legalistic,
tion to segregation and the eugenics movement); Appell, supra note 10, at 459-64 (noting the
racist, classist, and misogynist aspects of the Interethnic Adoption Act).
46 Martha Minow, Political Lawyering: An Introduction, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 287,
289 (1996) (discussing labor and civil rights legal advocacy as political); Hilbink, supra note
27, at 673; but see Robin West, Re-Imagining Justice, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 333, 335,
341 (2002) (arguing that legal justice is "facially apolitical" and, under its dominant concep-
tion, serves to defend against politics).
" See JOSEPH M. HAWES, THE CHILDREN'S RIGHTS MOVEMENT: A HISTORY OF ADVOCACY
AND PROTECTION 110-13 (1991) (describing children's rights won through litigation and leg-
islative advocacy on behalf of children in child welfare and education contexts); ROBERT H.
MNOOKIN, IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN: ADVOCACY, LAW REFORM, AND PUBLIC POLICY
(1996) (studies of major children's rights litigation in the twentieth century); Appell, supra
note 16 (rehearsing civil rights children achieved through litigation); Eskridge, supra note
43, at 450-51 (describing positive rights people with disability gained through legal advo-
cacy); Lowry, supra note 25.
48 E.g., Brown, 347 U.S. 483; see also, William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-
Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 2062, 2064-65 (2002) (discussing the role law plays in defining and then preserving
subordination of social or identity groups such as racial and sexual minorities and women
and how movement lawyers "translate[ ] the problems and aspirations of women and minori-
ties into constitutional discourse"); Gary B. Melton, Litigation In the Interests of Children:
Does Anybody Win?, 10 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 337, 340 n.4 (1986) (because children have
been subjected to segregation and unequal treatment, age-based discrimination should be
subject to strict scrutiny).
49 HAWES, supra note 47, at 98-121 (describing children's rights movements from 1960-
1990); Minow, supra note 12, at 1575-76 (describing children's rights literature from 19 60s
and 1970s).
50 Appell, supra note 16, at 154-56.
51 Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (freedom of expression); W. Va. . Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (freedom of expression); Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457
U.S. 853 (1982) (freedom to read); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (freedom to seek
judicial by-pass of parental consent to abortion); Carey v. Population Servs., Int'l., 431 U.S.
678 (1977) (right to contraception).
52 Brown, 347 U.S. at 483; Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Weber v. Aetna Cas &
Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973); N.J. Welfare Rights
Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
51 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975); In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358 (1970); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 585 (1975); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651
(1977).
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rights-based notions of justice. Although rights are extraordinarily important-
particularly for those who, like children, have few rights or inhabit a place
without political power,54 rights are also limited in that they generally are indi-
vidualistic, individualizing, legalistic, and reinforce existing power structures
and socio-economic inequities.55 Thus, legal justice approaches do little to
address systemic problems that create risks for children, such as racism, pov-
erty, poor schools, lack of economic opportunity, and lack of access to health
care.56 Indeed, legal justice approaches are, by definition, confined to maneu-
vering within the law and legal systems which are, by nature, conservative.57
As Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow explains: "In creating legal arguments,
lawyers legitimize at least some aspects of the system, and the kinds of legal
arguments and reasoning that they employ often cut them off from more imagi-
native ways of solving problems."5 8 In this way, legal rights advocacy may co-
opt those working for social change into more conventional frameworks.
51 Annette R. Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, 34 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 683, 765-78 (2001) (defending the political importance of family rights for families
that do not meet dominant norms of class, race, marital status and gender); Sarat & Sche-
ingold, supra note 43, at 9 (noting lawyers can "use rights claims" to expose inequality and
lay bare power disparities and social differences); Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes:
Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 416
(1987) ("rights imply a respect ... which elevates one's status from human body to social
being.").
55 See, e.g., Wendy Brown, Rights and Identity in Late Modernity: Revisiting the "Jewish
Question", in IDENTITIES, POLITICS, AND RIGHTS 85, 87, 118-19, 123 (Austin Sarat &
Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1995) (claiming rights depoliticize groups and individuals and
instead serve merely to privatize and mask social and material conditions and political and
economic forces); Richard Delgado, About Your Masthead: A Preliminary Inquiry into the
Compatibility of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 9-11 (2004)
(expressing this critique in context of civil liberties, rather than civil rights); Minow, supra
note 12, at 1579 ("The language of individual rights does not begin to illuminate the locus of
power and responsibility in corporate, foreign policy, and other adult decisions that have
foreshortened the life options of so many young people.")
56 West, supra note 46, at 340; see also William E. Forbath, Not So Simple Justice: Frank
Michelman on Social Rights, 1969 - Present, 39 TULSA L. REV. 597 (2004) (rehearsing the
ultimate failure of constitutionally-based economic justice litigation and theory); Sarat &
Scheingold, supra note 43, at 8 (noting conservatism of the law and limitations even of
political or legislative strategies for achieving distributive justice); Bell, supra note 40, at
478, 488 (explaining how the legal strategy for school desegregation failed to account for
"the complexity of achieving equal educational opportunity for children to whom it so long
has been denied" and the fact that "racial subordination of blacks [would be] reasserted in, if
anything, a more damaging form.")
57 Sarat & Scheingold, supra note 43, at 9; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 17, at 49-50.
There is a rich body of critique and analysis of legal justice advocacy and solutions. E.g.
Sarat & Scheingold, supra note 43, at 7-10; Michael McCann & Helena Silverstein, Rethink-
ing Law's "Allurements" A Relational Analysis of Social Movement Lawyers in the United
States, in CAUSE LAWYERING, supra note 17, at 261, 262-64; Menkel-Meadow, supra note
17, at 48-50; Martha Minow, Law and Social Change, 62 U. Mo. KAN. CITY L. REV. 171
(1993). In the context of children's rights, Appell, supra note 16; Guggenheim, supra note
16.
58 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 17, at 49. She further asks whether it is "a good thing for
social change that the NAACP, the Children's Legal Defense Fund, the Women's Legal
Defense Fund, and the Sierra Club are now included in legislative hearings and administra-
tive regulatory proceedings?" Id. at 49-50.
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Although legal rights are extraordinarily important for those without
power in a liberal political system that values private property and has both
hostility toward and lack of beneficent interest in poor people,5 9 it is not diffi-
cult to see in the context of children's advocacy that the legal justice approach
may not be the most effective means to promote children's voice and justice.
The individuating aspect of legal justice approaches disregards children's
developmental, economic and psychological dependencies by viewing the child
as separate and discrete. Yet, to the extent that children are embedded in fami-
lies, the welfare and needs of the entire family (and community) are essential to
the child's welfare.6 ° Treating a child as an individual rights holder can unduly
narrow advocacy which should, in many cases, address the needs of the child as
member of a family and community.
Second, a large category of children's rights, though important, is not
designed to promote children's voice. Unlike most adults, children are both
subjects of dependency rights and holders of emancipatory rights.6 The
emancipatory rights, which protect certain liberties of children, promote chil-
dren's voice and personhood. 62 For example, advocating for children's liberty
against, or while in, state care protects a child's freedom of expression and
conscience63 and freedom from arbitrary and unfair treatment.6 4 In contrast,
those rights arising out of children's dependency and need for protection gov-
ern adult care of children and are designed to socialize children into parental or
state values.65 These rights relate to what adults and the state owe children:
education, basic sustenance, and physical and medical care.66 These very
important dependency rights may, in the long run, promote children's freedom
and interests as adults, but they promote little immediate freedom for children,
and are most salient for young children with small voices who cannot effec-
tively advocate or provide for themselves. Moreover, dependency rights are
defined and applied in terms, on occasions and with choices that adults dic-
tate.6 7 In other words, even if children do have choices in these contexts, those
59 Appell, supra note 54.
60 Susan Brooks captures the importance and utility of representing the child in context,
rather than as individuals. E.g., Susan L. Brooks, Therapeutic and Preventive Approaches to
School Safety: Applications of a Family Systems Model, 34 NEW ENG. L. REV. 615 (1999-
2000); Susan L. Brooks, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Preventive Law in Child Welfare
Proceedings: A Family Systems Approach, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 951 (1999); Susan
L. Brooks, A Family Systems Paradigm for Legal Decision Making Affecting Child Custody,
6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (1996). See also Berta Esperanza Hemandez-Truyol, Ask-
ing the Family Question, 38 FAM. L.Q. 481 (2004) (sketching out an argument for placing
the needs of children and families at the center of international norm creation).
61 ARCHARD, supra note 42, at 55; Appell, supra note 16, at 154-61; Brighouse, supra note
42, at 698-99.
62 Appell, supra note 16, at 154-56.
63 E.g., Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503 (1969); W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943).
64 E.g., Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 585 (1975); In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
65 Appell, supra note 16, at 156; Kim Taylor-Thompson, Girl Talk-Examining Racial and
Gender Lines in Juvenile Justice, 6 NEV. L.J. 1137 (2006); Guggenheim, supra note 16.66 Appell, supra note 16, at 156-57.
67 MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT'S WRONG WITH CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 17-18, 90-91, 130-32
(2005).
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choices are confined to the options adults have selected. Thus, advocates may
argue that children should be able to choose where they live, but grant only
specific options such as parent or foster/adoptive parent and only when there is
an adult conflict regarding custody.6 8 Similarly, children may have a range of
choice as to where to attend school, but they do not have the choice not to
attend. Indeed, unlike emancipatory rights, dependency rights are not designed
to promote or even account for children's voice.69 On the contrary, these
dependency rights are historically and currently primarily concerned with pro-
tection of children and social control of families and children.7" I do not mean
to understate the vitalness of such rights, but wish merely to make clear that
they do not necessarily value children's voice or choice.
A third challenge the legal justice approach poses for children's voice is
that this approach involves legal advocacy and rights, and thus places lawyers
in a particularly heightened position of dominance. Lawyers seeking legal jus-
tice are in their milieu and can view themselves as substantive-as well as
technical-experts. 7 In other words, believing themselves to be the experts,
these lawyers may bring their own notion of substantive justice to the table and
fail to search for the child's view. Movement lawyers, particularly in class
action and legislative advocacy contexts, can be unduly dominant when they or
organizations are directing legal reform efforts.72 In these contexts, the clients
are a large and diffuse group with different goals and interests while the law-
yers are more identifiable and united.7 3 For example, Derrick Bell's classic
treatment of the school desegregation litigation revealed how the lawyers and
movement organizations chose a strategy, complete school desegregation, that
overlooked the socio-economic conditions that create and maintain racial sub-
ordination of African Americans; this disconnect occurred in part because the
lawyers and movement leaders were elites and not representative of the poor
families who most needed equal education opportunity and on whose behalf the
legal strategy was waged.7" Similarly, Neta Ziv, in the disability rights and
legislative context, illustrated how the lawyers who successfully worked to cre-
ate and pass the Americans with Disabilities Act, chose to press dominant
68 E.g., Melissa LaBarge, "C" is For Constitution: Recognizing the Due Process Rights of
Children in Contested Adoptions, 2 U. PENN. J. CONST. L. 318 (1999); Pitts, supra note 30,
at 347-49; Scarnecchia, supra note 25.
69 Even arguments for children's liberty interest in "choosing" parents are about adult deter-
minations and an adult-defined range of choices. GUGGENHEIM, supra note 67, at 246-49;
Appell, supra note 16, at 170-71.
70 Appell, supra note 16, at 156-71; see also Guggenheim, supra note 16; Taylor-Thomp-
son, supra note 65.
71 MNOOKIN, supra note 47, at 342.
72 See e.g., Bell, supra note 40 (describing how Black and White middle class lawyers and
established civil rights groups pushed for complete desegregation without accounting for the
effect such would have on poor African Americans); Ronald R. Edmonds, Advocating Ineq-
uity: A Critique of the Civil Rights Attorney in Class Action Desegregation Suits, 3 BLACK
L. J. 176 (1974) (describing the same situation as Bell); Neta Ziv, Cause Lawyers, Clients,
and the State: Congress as a Forum for Cause Lawyering during the Enactment of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, in CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATE IN A GLOBAL ERA
211 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2001).
73 Neta Ziv, supra note 72, at 218-20, 222-23.
7' Bell, supra note 40.
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movement goals of mainstreaming and inclusiveness over the goals of others in
the movement who desired more specialized and segregated resources.7 5 In
this legislative context, the lawyers had multiple loyalties and little contact with
clients so these minority views received less zealous advocacy.7 6
Representing children places lawyers in a magnificently powerful role.
This dominance is particularly acute because children's rights are normally
identified and pressed by adults on behalf of, not by, children. The children's
rights or advocacy movement, such as there is one or are several, mainly con-
sists of lawyers representing children (or their parents), law professors writing
about children, and policy makers making laws to protect or protect against
children. 77 Lawyers are deciding the terms of justice, but attorneys may have
limited perspectives regarding children and may not be in an optimal position
to define justice for children. Consider the distortion of children that children's
lawyers experience: lawyers mostly see children in the context of a legal prob-
lem. These legal problems generally come to the attention of an attorney when
the family is severely distressed, as in divorce, coercive state intervention to
protect or discipline children, or proceedings involving unaccompanied or
dependent non-citizen minors. Moreover, coercive state intervention dispro-
portionately falls on the backs of poor families and families of color who have
fewer resources and experience more stress than more mainstream families.78
Multiply this view of children in trouble from under-privileged or distressed
families by the repetition of attorney-client relationships in which the child is
the client and the context is litigation, and it becomes difficult to see children
beyond their problems, to see how similar to other children they are, and how
rich their lives are. In other words, it is natural to both narrow our gaze regard-
ing children's needs and identities and generalize our experience with troubled
children to form a vision of justice based on pathological experiences. Thus
legal justice advocacy for children can be based on negative and limited
(although repetitious) experiences regarding children, rather than positive and
organic views of children.
Under the legal justice approach, the expertise and power of the lawyer
diminish the power and volume of child. Instead, the lawyer seeks rights for
the child without, perhaps, an informed sense of how those rights will affect the
client and children more generally. Even in the civil rights context, Brown v.
Board of Education, an extraordinarily important victory for racial justice,79
may not have provided the remedy the children wanted and, as we know in
hindsight, caused children and their families great suffering. Had the poor
black parents and children of Kansas been consulted, different relief may have
been sought.8"
" Ziv, supra note 72, at 227-35.
76 Id. at 217-21, 227-35. The lawyers themselves "described their clients as 'all people with
disabilities in the U.S.,'" id. at 223, while they had most contact and confidential relation-
ships with legislators, lobbyists and disability organizations. Id. at 217-19, 224, 226, 231.
77 See infra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
78 See Appell, supra note 54, at 769.
7' Edmonds, supra note 72, at 176; see also James T. Patterson, Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion and the Civil Rights Movement, 34 STETSON L. REv. 413 (2005) (briefly rehearsing the
positive and negative influences of Brown).
80 Bell, supra note 40, at 489-93; Edmonds, supra note 72, at 178-80.
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For the most part then, individual children or groups of children are not
articulating or actively shaping the content of legal justice; nor often are their
parents or communities. On the contrary, it is generally lawyers, often
informed by other professionals, who determine what rights to create or
expand.8' It is easy and natural for these lawyers to extrapolate from the few to
the many, allow legal theory and social science to guide them, or follow their
own ideas about justice for children.82 Such cognitive leaps are possible and
"natural" because lawyers and other professionals are "experts," particularly in
law and policy contexts and when identifying general solutions. Yet, this type
of knowledge is both distilled and divorced from the intended beneficiaries of
these rights, particularly when one considers that those who are disenfranchised
are the ones most often in need of rights. For example, in the school desegre-
gation litigation, class distinctions between those who drove the litigation
(white liberals and middle class blacks) and those who would live with the bulk
of the "relief' (poor black children) led to results that disregarded the wisdom
and goals of lower class black parents.8 3 Similarly, advocating for children in
other contexts without engaging them, their families and their communities
may lead to unwelcome, and perhaps destructive remedies and results. As Der-
rick Bell noted in the context of class-action litigation, "lawyers' freedom to
pursue their own ideas of right may pose no problems as long as both clients
and [those directing the litigation] share a common social outlook." 84 Simi-
larly, lawyers acting on behalf of children may find it easier to follow their own
voices toward legal justice rather than the voice of the child, but it is unlikely
that the attorneys and their clients share a common outlook.
C. Social Justice Approach
A third approach to lawyering for children is to advocate for social justice.
This approach reaches beyond legal justice and toward modifying the social
structures and material conditions that oppress certain groups of people. Social
justice refers to fair distribution of economic and social goods and opportunity,
and to other conditions necessary for individuals to be self-determining and
meaningful participants in social and political institutions.85 Social justice
embraces the complex interrelationships among economic well-being, access to
social goods-such as quality education and freedom from oppression, and par-
81 Melton, supra note 48, at 346-51.
82 1 include myself here. For example, since representing children who resisted termination
of their parents' parental rights and adoption because they did not want to lose contact with
their families, I have worked for nearly two decades on litigation and legislation to guarantee
children the opportunity to have ongoing contact with members of their birth families after
adoption. E.g., In re M.M., 619 N.E.2d 702 (111.1993); 2005 Nev. Laws Ch. 413 (A.B. 51).
83 Edmonds, supra note 72, at 178-79.
84 Bell, supra note 40 at 490.
85 IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 37 (1990); Forbath,
supra note 56, at 621; John A. Powell, The Needs of Members in a Legitimate Democratic
State, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 969, 976 (2004). But see HOWARD COHEN, EQUAL RIGHTS
FOR CHILDREN 42 (1980) (equating social justice for children with having rights equal to
those adults have).
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ticipation in public affairs.86 As with other approaches to justice for children,
social justice advocates may pursue legal strategies. Like the legal justice
approach, a social justice approach, may involve political action through
engagement in policy development and advocacy. However, social justice law-
yers further engage a political approach to the attorney's role and mission that
combines self-consciousness (and restraint) regarding the attorney's power vis-
A-vis clients and goals of collective good (rather than individual rights and solu-
tions).87 Thus the social justice approach infuses the lawyer's means and ends
with notions of social justice: the goal is social justice and the method is
engagement with the client and the client's world. In other words, social jus-
tice lawyers seek justice as the client defines it.
Indeed, in the abstract, it is not clear what social justice for "children"
would look like. The primary goal of social justice is to remove barriers to, or
otherwise create the conditions for, self determination-to have the freedom to
choose one's own path and to participate fully in public life. For children, that
goal could be construed as an immediate aim: to provide the conditions neces-
sary for children, while still children, to be full citizens in the sense of self
determination and civic participation. 8 Perhaps more practically, social justice
advocacy for children might be construed as providing the conditions for them
to become self determining persons on the road to and throughout their major-
ity.89 Indeed, this view of social justice for children is consistent with-but
more expansive than-current dominant perspectives of childhood and the role
of children, parents and the state in which childhood is widely understood to be
a time of social, psychological and physical development, of becoming adults
86 See, e.g., Peter Edelman, Where Race Meets Class: The 21st Century Civil Rights
Agenda, 12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 1 (2005) (urging a civil rights strategy for the
present century that would address structural economic, racial, distributive, social and spatial
barriers to equality); Nicola Lacey, Theories of Justice and the Welfare State, I Soc. &
LEGAL STUD. 323, 326-27 (1992) ("freedom ... depends on the positive provision of certain
facilities, the meeting of needs and so on, which allow us to live a free life in the sense that
we can be said genuinely to be authors of our own decisions"); Powell, supra note 85, at
975-91 (discussing the complex relationships between economic need, social exclusion,
political power, and freedom).
87 See Gary Bellow, Steady Work: A Practitioner's Reflections on Political Lawyering, 31
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297, 300-05 (1996); Gerald P. L6pez, Living and Lawyering
Rebelliously, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2041 (2005); Gerald P. L6pez, An Aversion to Clients:
Loving Humanity and Hating Human Beings, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 315, 321-23
(1996); Lucie E. White, Facing South: Lawyering for Poor Communities in the Twenty-First
Century, 25 FORDHAM URB. LI. 813 (1998). See also Hilbink, supra note 27, at 682-90
(discussing "grassroots lawyering" as critical of law and lawyers as agents of social change,
interested in empowering clients and working in the context, or as part, of social
movements).
88 See HOWARD COHEN, supra note 85, at 42-73 & 101-14 (arguing that beginning at birth,
children should have the same rights as adults); Minow, supra note 12, at 1575-78 (describ-
ing children's liberation movement, including Cohen); Peterson, supra note 5, at 170-71
(arguing that if children voted, they might achieve the same the same level of rational social
and economic benefits that the elderly enjoy).
89 This appears to be the approach of the Children's Defense Fund. Marian Wright
Edelman, Why Don't We Have the Will to End Child Poverty?, 10 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. &
POL'Y 273 (2003); see also JOHN O'NEILL, THE MISSING CHILD IN LIBERAL THEORY 4-9
(1994).
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and during which children need care, nurture and education.9" Under our lib-
eral, capitalistic political and economic structures, children receive these social
goods according to the ability of their parents and community to provide them.
The provision of many social and economic goods, however, is beyond the
means of many parents and beyond the reach of their communities. It may
make sense then to think of social justice, and social justice advocacy, for chil-
dren as seeking a floor of social and economic opportunity so that children
would be guaranteed opportunity without regard to where or to whom they
happened to be born. This goal might encompass meaningful educational
opportunity and benefits (including head start),9 1 economic benefits (family
supports, including a living wage, child care, and adequate affordable hous-
ing),92 safe neighborhoods, parks,93 and eradication of racism, homophobia and
other subordinating preferences or moral differentiations that inhibit equality.94
This list reflects the needs of children and also extends to their families and
neighborhoods and larger communities, reflecting the fact that children are not
isolated, independent beings. As Marian Wright Edelman says: "children do
not come in pieces but in families and communities. 95
This list of objectives or needs also stands in contrast to the way we tend
to think of children and their needs in legal contexts where goals or objectives
are often framed in individual psychological terms of child development. Thus,
in child welfare or other custody matters, the children's needs are primarily
individualized, privatized, and developmental. That is, principles of child
development define children's social needs in terms of preserving psychologi-
cal attachments, providing a safe home (rather than house, school or commu-
nity) in which the child's needs for physical and emotional growth and safety
are met, and ensuring the child receives education. If children do not or cannot
receive those things in their home, they are placed into another home.
Although the child welfare context suggests that services should be provided in
90 E.g., ARCHARD, supra note 42, at 55-56; ALLISON JAMES & ADRIAN L. JAMES, CON-
STRUCTING CHILDHOOD 36 (2004); Brighouse, supra note 42, at 698-99. Indeed, this theme
of aspiration toward autonomy in the face of dependency is, according to Hendrick Hartog,
at the root of our conception of constitutional rights. Hendrick Hartog, The Constitution of
Aspiration and "The Rights That Belong to Us All", 74:3 J. AM. HIST. 1013, 1018-20 (1987).
91 Wright Edelman, supra note 89; Martha Minow, Just Education: An Essay for Frank
Michelman, 39 TULSA L. REV. 547, 556 (2004); Hillary Rodham, Children Under the Law,
43 HARV. EDUC. REV. 487, 502-3 (1973).
92 See Edelman, supra note 86 (listing the economic, racial and social barriers to leaving
poverty and suggesting a strategy of framing issues in large social and economic terms that
addresses and organize around a living wage, jobs, appropriate education, child care, afford-
able housing, and spatial de-concentration of poverty). For more narrow strategies for estab-
lishing government obligations to provide a basic level of subsistence primarily through cash
assistance to children and their families, see, e.g., Kay P. Kindred, God Bless the Child:
Poor Children, Parens Patriae, and a State Obligation to Provide Assistance, 57 OHIO ST.
L.J. 519 (1996); Sarah Ramsey & Daan Braveman, "Let Them Starve": Government's Obli-
gation to Children in Poverty, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1607 (1995).
93 Robert Garcia et al., Healthy Children, Healthy Communities: Schools, Parks, Recrea-
tion, and Sustainable Regional Planning, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1267 (2004).
94 HAIR, supra note 26, at 4-7 & 9-12; see also YOUNG, supra note 85, at 36-37; Carol
Quillen, Feminist Theory, Justice and the Lure of the Human, 27 SIGNS: J. OF WOMEN IN
CULTURE & Soc'y 87, 95-96 (2001).
95 Edelman, supra note 89, at 276.
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the home or to the parents before a child is placed with another family,96 those
services are individualized-homemaker, cash assistance, counseling, drug
treatment-and not aimed at the underlying social, economic, spatial and politi-
cal factors that create or maintain risk for families. 97 In the juvenile justice
context, the problems and remedies may involve community, but are designed
to treat the child and not the communal lack of employment and educational
opportunity and other social and economic goods that contribute to youth
crime.9 8 Educational advocacy too is generally aimed at getting children into
schools and pushing schools to meet their cognitive, behavioral and physical
needs, but not aimed at conditions that contribute to inequities within and
among schools. 9 9
Similarly, the social justice approach may stand in contrast to viewing
children's problems and solutions as the subject of professional and technologi-
cal expertise. 10 0 A social justice approach views community and structural
issues while engaging the members of those communities to identify what they
need, rather than relying on the assessments of professionals. More dominant
approaches rely on professionals and technology to assess and meet the needs
of children. For example, the structure of our child welfare system privileges
the developmental well-being of individual children within individual families
and provides the greatest material benefits and support to care for children in
foster families; the child welfare system does not privilege a public health or
distributive model that addresses the material conditions of families and their
communities.' 1 Other examples of technological, rather than holistic,
approaches are found in international aid that seeks to meet the needs of the
child without taking into consideration the child's larger family system and
96 Kathleen S. Bean, Reasonable Efforts: What State Courts Think, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 321,
345-46 (2005).
97 Indeed, a recent special issue of the Child Welfare League of America journal devoted to
"Community Building and 21 st Century Child Welfare" addressed primarily services to fam-
ilies and did take a broader approach to advocating for improvement of community well-
being. 84 CHILD WELFARE J. 101-336 (2005).
98 Youth crime is inversely tied to lack of resources. Linda Harris, What's a Youngster to
Do? The Education and Labor Market Plight of Youth in High-Poverty Communities, 39
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 126 (2005). Yet even the "Positive Youth Development" approach to
juvenile justice appears to acknowledge but skirt larger questions of social and economic
resources in communities. See Jeffrey Butts, Susan Mayer, & Gretchen Ruth, Focusing
Juvenile Justice on Positive Youth Development, CHAPIN HALL ISSUE BRIEF, Oct. 2005, at 4-
8, abstract available at http://www.chapinhall.org/article-abstract.aspx?ar=-1414&L2=62&
L3=105. Similarly, the ready availability of guns to youth is a major contributor to gun
violence which begs for a public health approach that would eliminate the material source of
the problem-the guns. Garen J. Wintemute, Where the Guns Come From: The Gun Indus-
try and Gun Commerce, THE FUTURE OF CHILD., Summer/Fall 2002, at 55.
99 HAWES, supra note 47, at 110; David M. Engel, Law, Culture, and Children With Disa-
bilities: Educational Rights and the Construction of Difference, 1991 DUKE L.J. 166, 169-
94. Of course one reason for this relatively narrow advocacy is tied to the practicalities of
operating in a legal system where formal, rather than substantive, equality rules. For exam-
ple, education advocates have long sought equitable funding for education, but have not
fared well. E.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
100 Appell, supra note 16, at 159-60; Appell, supra note 10, at 440.
101 LEROY PELTON, FOR REASONS OF POVERTY (1987). But see, MAKING CHILD WELFARE
WORK, supra note 22 (describing reform efforts that addressed certain material needs of
children and families and sought systemic reform of the child welfare system).
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labor conditions. Thus, provision of oral rehydration therapy technologies to
impoverished children is of little benefit if there is not clean water, adequate
child care, accessible medical care, and enough food. 1°2 Similarly, promotion
of breast-feeding without accounting for the entry of poor, rural mothers into
the paid labor market, does not provide a workable solution to the serious prob-
lem of feeding young babies bottled formula. 103 Attempts to protect girls by
prohibiting marriage before they turn eighteen do not address the "redistribu-
tive and structural changes needed to address the causes of early marriage [and]
.. . [do] not implicate the developed nations in the causes or the cure."' °
International child labor movements promote elimination of child labor rather
than improving the working conditions for child laborers who have no choice
but to work. 0 5
Of course, my discussion of social justice so far takes little account of the
aspect of the social justice approach which engages the children-the persons
who are seeking (or perhaps needing) social justice. Instead, it reflects a
generic adult view of such justice. It is not clear what children would consider
to be social justice, though I suspect it would vary greatly by age, economic
status, race, and other aspects of identity and social standing. 10 6 Indeed, the
category of child is so contingent and variable that it may be difficult to discern
communal principles. The breadth of social justice, combined with the inco-
herency of "child," may fail to cabin attorneys unless attorneys use the contex-
tualized approach of social justice advocacy. Without such context, the
primary weakness of the social justice approach, lays, as it does under the legal
justice approach, in the inordinately unbalanced power between adult attorneys
and child clients.
This imbalance is particularly problematic because children's attorneys do
not regularly speak the language of social justice.0 7 Instead, social justice
advocates are women's, anti-poverty, civil rights, or community lawyers or
advocates. 10 8 These social justice advocates and their communities may in fact
102 Scheper-Hughes & Sargent, supra note 12, at 3-5.
103 Id. at 5-7.
1o Annie Bunting, Stages of Development: Marriage of Girls and Teens as an Interna-
tional Human Rights Issue, 14 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 17, 32 (2005).
105 Antonella Invernizzi & Brian Milne, Are Children Entitled to Contribute to Interna-
tional Policy Making? A Critical View of Children's Participation in the International Cam-
paign for the Elimination of Child Labour, 10 INT'L J. CHILD. RTS. 403 (2002).
106 For a sampling of children's concerns, see Wiebina Heesterman, An Assessment of the
Impact of Youth Submissions to the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, 13
INT'L J. CHILD. RTS. 351, 354-73 (2005).
107 Although there are attorneys working on behalf of children and their families and com-
munities who do speak this language. E.g., Marian Wright Edelman (at the Children's
Defense Fund); Center for Law in the Public Interest, Los Angeles, CA, www.clipi.org (last
visited May 16, 2006); see Garcia et al., supra note 93, at 1276-90.
108 See Doug Imig, Mobilizing Parents and Communities for Children, in WHO SPEAKS FOR
AMERICA'S CHILDREN: THE ROLE OF CHILD-ADVOCATES IN PUBLIC POLICY 147-49 (Carol J.
De Vita & Rachel Mosher-Williams eds., 2001) [hereinafter WHO SPEAKS FOR AMERICA'S
CHILDREN]; Theda Skocpol & lillian Dickert, Speaking for Families and Children in a
Changing Civil America, in WHO SPEAKS FOR AMERICA'S CHILDREN, supra (describing
social justice work of the National Parent Teacher Association, Children's Defense Fund,
National Partnership for Women and Families, and Texas Industrial Areas Foundation). See
also CENTER FOR COMMUNITY RESEARCH & SERVICE, UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE, COMMU-
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be motivated by the needs and future of children and use rhetoric regarding
children, but they do not appear to identify with children's attorneys, nor the
children's attorneys with them.'0 9 This divorce between advocacy for children
and for their communities illustrates the challenges of consulting children in a
quest for social justice. Just as children's voice can be subsumed by the attor-
ney's superior knowledge of legal norms in the legal justice context, so too in
the social justice context it may be difficult for the child's voice-in literal
terms-to drive the quest for justice unless children's attorneys embrace the
bottom-up holistic methods of social justice advocacy. Social justice lawyers
allow the client to guide them-in context, in need, in objectives. For child
clients, this approach contemplates a dynamic, collaborative engagement with
children, their parents and their communities both to define (and modify)
problems and solutions and to develop (and modify) strategies for achieving
solutions. It seeks child's voice in a broader but more grounded, contextual
arena, and this may be a promising and respectful approach to engaging chil-
dren in the pursuit of justice because engaging children means engaging those
whom they value. In the next section, I will return to these questions and to
adult social justice advocacy in an attempt to sketch some models for discern-
ing children's voice.
In summary, there are three relatively distinct conceptual approaches to
seeking justice for children: procedural justice-representing children in pro-
ceedings in which they have legal interests; legal justice-enhancing existing,
or creating new, rights for children through litigation or policy advocacy; and
social justice-advocating for the conditions needed for substantive equality
and freedom for children as children or as they become adults. In all cases,
children's attorneys seek to represent their client's wishes and interests in judi-
cial and administrative proceedings or to promote a cause larger than the inter-
ests of an individual client. The strengths and weaknesses of each approach,
perhaps inversely, relate to their possibilities for substantive change and the
breadth of the attorney's role. These strengths and weaknesses cut each way in
identifying and respecting children's voice. Whatever approach children's law-
yers take, we should be mindful of the heightened balance of power we as
attorneys have in relation to child clients who are disadvantaged by lack of
education and varying levels of intellectual and emotional maturity. This
imbalance can easily allow children's attorneys to substitute our notion of the
good for our client's, particularly as the lawyer's approach to justice becomes
more expansive.
NITY DEVELOPMENT AND FAMILY SUPPORT: FORGING A PRACTICAL NEXUS TO STRENGTHEN
FAMILIES AND COMMUNITIES 10-13 (2003), available at http://www.aecf.org/publications/
browse.php?filter=3.
1o Cf. Carol J. De Vita, et al., Nonprofit Organizations Engaged in Child Advocacy, in
WHO SPEAKS FOR AMERICA'S CHILDREN, supra note 108, at 3 (reporting on their study of
IRS records that revealed few legal advocates and little advocacy).
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III. REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN FAMILIES
Depending on how we approach our professional roles and who our clients
are, our advocacy can embody more of ourselves (our values) or the children
(and their values). The Fordham Conference on representing children outlined
the delicacy of representing children, of ensuring that we do not run over them,
that we hear and see them." 0 Those lessons are particularly poignant when we
seek to give children voice and when we seek more substantive justice. These
are not necessarily identical endeavors. I argue that they should be-that chil-
dren's voice should guide lawyering for children under any approach to justice.
I further suggest that we start to take more of a social justice approach, at least
in its contextual method of representation, and that we cast a critical eye toward
our advocacy because children's rights are not necessarily informed by, and do
not necessarily promote, children's voice.
In the absence of contextual approaches to children's voice, the lawyer's
role, particularly in the social and legal justice models, can become too large
and undefined. This incoherence is compounded because "children" does not
signify a uniform, constant or coherent referent. On the contrary, the "child's
voice" is contingent on which children are being given voice and for what
purpose. The very notion of the child's voice, especially in larger policy con-
texts, is challenging because children speak with so many different voices and
often in the context of individual cases. 1 ' Moreover, children do not necessa-
rily speak the language of adults or the legal systems in which they are being
given voice; thus their own voice is susceptible to interpretation and translation,
i.e., distortion, by the adults-even their own lawyers.1 12 This section sets up
and then begins to resolve the conundrum of seeking justice for children in
children's terms. First, I make explicit what we all know: that there are few
generalizations applicable to children or even a particular child and that the
category "child" is as full and empty as other categories we use for people,
such as "woman" or "Native American." Next, I discuss strategies lawyers can
use to identify their child clients' voices. I conclude this part with a reflection
on the thinness of legalistic attorney-dominated child advocacy and suggest a
more expansive, social justice oriented approach.
A. The Contingency of Childhood and Children's Voice
It is not clear for social or legal justice purposes who the "children" are
and who determines precisely what constitutes justice for children. "Child" as
a legal category refers in most contexts to human beings between the age of
110 See supra text accompanying notes 13-14.
.. See JAMES & JAMES, supra note 90, at 82-83 (discussing the contingency of the contents
of rights under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child).
112 See Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 80
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1449, 1493 (2005) (claiming that the law's and defense lawyers' silencing of
criminal defendants can both mask their misunderstanding of the proceedings and make
them less cognitively engaged in their defense); Lucie E. White, Seeking ". . . the Faces of
Otherness. . . ": A Response to Professors Sarat, Felstiner, and Cahn, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
1499 (1992).
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birth and 18.113 Once they attain certain ages, developmental stages, or engage
in various behaviors, the law may view them more like adults." 14 "Child" as a
legal category seems to beg for legal solutions: provision of legal and procedu-
ral rights and removal of legal and procedural disabilities. "Child" as a social
category, however, presents deep challenges regarding what self-determina-
tion-or the means to achieve it-would mean. Socially unifying themes or
aspects of children are elusive because human beings within this age group
vary according to developmental stages, race, native language, culture, sex,
gender, sexuality, class membership, social status, education and educational
choices, religion, custodial relations, immigration status, etc." 5 This elusive-
ness is especially pronounced in the United States where the material condi-
tions of children are heavily dictated by class and race, and the content of self
determination is heavily dictated by culture and gender.' 
16
It is thus difficult to discern a universal theory of what rights and social
goods children need and should have precisely because it is difficult to discern
a unifying factor for the identity of "child."' 1 7 This of course is true of most
identity-based groups, e.g., "woman," "Black," "African American," "lesbian,"
"gay," or "bisexual, ' 18 but it seems even more so for children, perhaps
because of the liminality of "child." In other words, childhood is defined in
opposition to so many things: e.g., adulthood, parenthood, competence, inde-
pendence that it becomes difficult to identity to what or whom "child" refers.
Moreover, "childhood" even as a legal construct has become less stable." 9
Just as children differ from one another as individuals and in terms of age,
race, class, religion, geographical location, social status, language, and culture,
they also each experience different roles in their own lives: for example, they
are child at home (vis--vis parent); student at school; caretaker at home when
helping with younger siblings, cousins, or a disabled parent; employee at work;
defendant or respondent in criminal or juvenile justice matters. Assessments of
power, oppression, opportunity and justice may be different depending on each
of these settings because although children are children in each of these
instances, their oppositions may vary and the power holder and the child's
"13 Though at least one jurisdiction has extended childhood to the womb. E.g., Whitner v.
State, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997).
"1l Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547
(2000).
115 Bunting, supra note 104; see also JAMES & JAMES, supra note 90, at 29 (critiquing
universal notions of "child").
116 See Appell, supra note 54, at 782-87.
117 See Barrie Thorne, Re-Visioning Women and Social Change: Where are the Children?,
1 GENDER & Soc'y 85, 96, 98 (1987) (noting that the variability within the category of
children makes it difficult to identify a "child-like nature" and that viewing "children in
terms of development and socialization ... deflect[s] attention from children's varied cir-
cumstances, experiences, and social relations.")
I I8 See, e.g., Barbara Fedders, Coming Out for Kids: Recognizing, Respecting, and Repre-
senting LGBTQ Youth, 6 NEv. L.J. 774 (2006); Katherine M. Franke, Cunning Stunts: From
Hegemony to Desire a Review of Madonna's Sex, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 549,
555-72 (1994); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN.
L. REV. 581, 608-12 (1990).
119 See Scott, supra note 114, at 550-58 (rehearsing the divergent legal constructions of
youth in various contexts).
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experience of that power holder are contextual. 120 For example, a child at
home might experience an older sibling as an oppressor, even as the child loves
that sibling and has some power to alter the rules of engagement; a child in
police custody experiences oppression from a true adversary, has less power
against that adversary with much at stake, and fewer resources to marshal
toward freedom; and children playing in the street share common rules, power
relationships, dispute resolution systems, and conceptions of justice. Thus, just
as child is contingent, so too may children's justice depend on the setting. 21
It is important also to remember that when we talk about lawyers for chil-
dren or advocacy for children, we are usually talking about poor children. 22 In
our version of liberal democracy, rich children have their needs met by their
parents and are "protected" by the privacy of family. That is, their parents can
pay for their own and their children's needs. These children, with their social
and economic capital, have access to what they need and are less likely to
encounter the justice system because they are not routinely targets of police or
social service surveillance; also, they have more options and fewer unmet
needs, so the stakes are, generally, too high for these youth to risk serious legal
trouble. Moreover, children may view and experience justice and the power of
the state very differently based on class and race, and state action may have
different outcomes along these lines. Doing our best to bring children's voices
to our representation should both maximize the best aspects of our profession-
alism and bring to bear children's perspectives to the content of justice.' 23
Lawyers for children should be mindful of these complex and disparate
relationships between children's voice and justice. Children's voice should
inform and guide justice, but its variety, softness, and youth easily confound
that goal. Children are extraordinarily diverse and each child inhabits multiple
roles, so universal principles of children's justice are difficult (perhaps impossi-
ble) to devise and execute. The answer is not, I hope, to throw our hands up at
these challenges and substitute our own platonic professional opinions regard-
ing justice for children. Instead, these challenges make our work much richer,
engaging and, hopefully, more meaningful for ourselves and the children we
seek to serve. The challenge for us is to check ourselves so that we do not
overwhelm our clients, so that we can hear them. In other words, children's
lawyers might do best for their child clients if we embrace traditional ethical
120 For a series of studies regarding children's assessments of their various roles, see
MAYALL, supra note 39.
121 Moreover, the utility of rights-based justice then may vary according to these settings or
oppositions. See GUGGENHEIM, supra note 67, at 245-54 (distinguishing between children's
rights against parents and against the state); Appell, supra note 16, at 166-71 (distinguishing
between children's civil and dependency rights).
122 As youth advocates note, "[o]n any given week a lawyer assigned to protect the rights
and interests of children ... wonders: 'The youth I serve are from families struggling to
survive in low-wealth communities, where crime, disinvested schools, a dearth of jobs, and a
lack of quality social services are normal. What difference am I making?'" Joe Scan-
tlebury, et al., Preparing Vulnerable Youth for Adulthood Through Youth Workforce Devel-
opment, 39 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 229, 229-30 (2005).
123 Cf Natapoff, supra note 112, at 1501 (claiming that the silencing of criminal defendants
"affirmatively shapes the law in ways that further disadvantages them").
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boundaries that separate our goals from those of our clients. 124 Yet we should
also depart from traditional boundaries that view a client as an automaton and
instead view children as embedded in their own families and communities with
their own unique identities, values, and needs. This is not to say we should
give up on furthering substantive justice, but that we should be sure our notions
of the good are grounded in our clients' worlds, rather than our own.
B. Discerning A Child's Voice
Whatever vision of justice one brings to representing children, the pre-
ferred methodology of social justice lawyers may be useful for finding and
discerning children's voice. 125 Professor Jean Koh Peters's defining article for
the Fordham Conference, The Roles and Content of Best Interests in Client-
Directed Lawyering for Children in Child Protective Proceedings,12 6 and her
subsequently published book, Representing Children in Child Protective Pro-
ceedings: Ethical and Practical Dimensions, i'7 arise out of the social justice
lawyering method of engaging clients. Peters provides an elegant, nonlinear
structure for representing children in child protection cases that is heavily
aimed at checking lawyers' tendency to disregard the individuality of less com-
petent clients and substitute the attorney's judgment of what is in the client's
interest, rather than digging deeply and broadly enough to understand the cli-
ent's perspective.
Peters addresses advocacy in child welfare matters and prescribes lawyers
to engage other professionals to aid the attorney in representing the child and
understanding the importance of parents and community to the child's psycho-
logical development. 128 I want to build on these prescriptions to further the
goal of respecting the client's uniqueness and individuality in any forum and
will do so by exploring the role of the child, family and community in illumi-
nating and understanding the child's voice. My goal, like Peters' (though she is
too polite to put it this way), is to undermine our arrogance as attorneys in a
way that respects our expertise and creates room for the child to emerge. My
goal too is to expand our views of children beyond legal and mental health
frameworks.
1. Maintain Role Veracity
So what does it mean for children's attorneys to allow the child to emerge
and remain on top? First, it means doing our best as adults and professionals to
124 See Sarat & Scheingold, supra note 43, at 7-9 (distinguishing between traditional and
public interest lawyers).
125 See supra note 94 and accompanying text; GERALD P. L6PEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING:
ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992); L6pez, Living and Lawyer-
ing Rebelliously, supra note 87; White, supra note 112.
126 Jean Koh Peters, The Roles and Content of Best Interests in Client-Directed Lawyering
for Children in Child Protective Proceedings, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1505 (1996).
127 JEAN KOH PETERS, REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN CHILD PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS: ETHI-
CAL AND PRACTICAL DIMENSIONS (2001). Peters describes the book as trying to answer "the
central question facing lawyers for children: How do lawyers for children represent children
in a lawyerly way, one that is deeply respectful of the individuality and unique perspective of
the client?" Peters, supra note 126, at 1508.
128 Peters, supra note 126, at 1514-53.
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maintain a clear understanding of, and adherence to, our roles as legal profes-
sionals. This means that we provide legal representation or legal skills to plan-
ning or problem solving. I continue to be struck by my own arrogance and that
of my peers when we think we know best for our clients, especially our child
clients. I moderated a plenary regarding legal ethics in 2004 at the Annual
Conference of the National Association of Children's Counsel in Las Vegas,
Nevada. 12 9 There were around one hundred children's attorneys in the room
and a large proportion of them felt obliged, even if not required under law, to
protect their clients from harm, even if that meant betraying their client's confi-
dence or operating against their express wishes. Thus, these lawyers might,
perhaps unconsciously, seek to avoid for their clients certain risks rather than
others. But we must remember that there may not be risk-free choices for our
clients and that our assessment of which risk is more desirable or safer for the
child is just that, our assessment. How are we to say whether the risk or near
certainty of abuse or neglect is worse or better than the risk of losing one's
home and family? Or whether entering into a plea in a juvenile or criminal
matter that implicates a family member or neighbor is the best course of action?
Who are we to predict what will happen in the future or to know, assess and
balance certain risks? We think we know what is best for children, what chil-
dren should want, and what they deserve because we all were children, most of
us had parents, and many of us are parents.1 30 Yet our experiences as children
and as parents are not why we are appointed or retained to represent children.
We inhabit this role because we have legal training.
2. Mute Our Voices
Second, finding and respecting a child's voice means doing our best as
adults and professionals to mute our voices. That means doing our best not to
project our class, race, gender and professional orientations or values onto our
clients and their dilemmas. Besides guarding against viewing our clients as
ourselves or our children, muting our voices means that we search for our cli-
ents' views and voices. We must have faith in their wisdom and their identity,
as far away from our own wisdom and identity as our clients may be. This is
difficult for all lawyers, not just those who represent children, but having faith
in our clients, or biting our tongues when we are losing faith, can be the most
respectful and wise course. Professor Nancy Polikoff describes a situation in
which she was representing the "Radical Faeries" in a civil disobedience action
at the Supreme Court during the National March on Washington for Lesbian
and Gay Rights in 1987.1 3 1 Polikoff writes that she disagreed with their tactics
because she believed that men in skirts were too provocative to promote under-
standing and that their actions and appearance would be too far outside the
129 Ethical Issues in Legal Representation in Children's Cases, National Association of
Children's Counsel, 27th National Children's Law Conference, held in Las Vegas, NV, Sept.
10, 2004.
3I Michele Cortese, Tanya Krupat & Ronald Richter, Engaging Parents as a Path to
Reunification: Surfacing Values and Dismantling Assumptions, 24 A.B.A. CHILD L. PRAC-
TICE 81, 89 (2005).
131 Nancy D. Polikoff, Am I My Client?: The Role Confusion of a Lawyer Activist, 31
HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 443, 444 (1996).
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norm for the Radical Faeries' to persuasively convey their message of peace
and tolerance.' 3 2 Polikoff muted her doubts and her own notions of what con-
stituted acceptable and effective demonstration and as a result, "[b]y the time
they were out of jail, [she] ... saw their bravery and courage to be true to their
innermost selves."' 33 I know I have had similar experiences with my adult and
child clients, doubting their judgment or the way that their actions would be
perceived, but also coming to recognize the wisdom and integrity of those
actions. These experiences humble me as I learn and re-learn that my clients
are the ones who know their worlds and often know what actions are most
effective; my clients also know when they need to undertake an action or stake
out a position to preserve their own integrity.
Another way in which we should be mindful of muting our voices is when
we are concerned that our advocacy for our clients will disrupt our professional
personas and reputations. This is a very real problem particularly for repeat
players-attorneys who regularly appear in the same court room or against the
same institutional players, such as public defenders or children's law office
attorneys who regularly advocate for clients before and among the same deci-
sion-makers. For example, Marty Guggenheim raises examples of courts
removing children's attorneys and calling their competency into question, when
they take positions against the state in child protective proceedings.' Simi-
larly, attorneys who appear in the same courtroom or before the same players
regularly risk appearing unreasonable or incredible if they push too hard for an
apparently unreasonable or unpopular position on behalf of a client. Such
advocacy or identification with a client may harm the attorney's ability to advo-
cate effectively for other clients and can threaten the attorney's identification
with the other professionals with whom she or he works repeatedly. Moreover,
we want to look good in the eyes of our peers-those judges, social workers,
community leaders, and other attorneys with whom we spend more time than
with any one client and to whom we often look for approval and reflection;
becoming associated too heavily with our "bad" or "unreasonable" or "radical"
clients threatens our association with and status before our professional
colleagues. '3 5
3. Actively Engage the Child's World
Third, finding and respecting children's voice means getting to know chil-
dren on their terms in their worlds. This requires us to be searching out and
then open to the people who are important to our clients. Such an approach is
needed because children during much of their minority are less able to articu-
late, predict, or understand the relationships between present and future, one
132 Id. at 464-65.
133 Id. at 465.
134 Guggenheim, supra note 16.
135 Polikoff also rehearses a story of a prominent, mainstream lesbian and gay movement
attorney whose ACT UP clients handcuffed themselves to members of the AIDS organiza-
tions against whom they were pressing health care demands. Polikoff, supra note 131, at
465-66. The attorney disagreed with these tactics and after unsuccessfully counseling her
clients to stop, she resigned as their counsel and left the demonstration. Id. at 466. One of
her clients experienced the attorney's conduct as an attempt "to make herself look good in
front of her peers at the table." Id. (quoting ACT UP member Juan Mendez).
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aspect of their lives and another, and the needs and motivations of those impor-
tant to them. While it is true that children have their own rich, complex and
unique life experiences and desires, and that as they age, they have increasing
moral autonomy, it is also true that they are not as independent as adults (who
of course also have dependencies). Like adults, children have multiple attach-
ments, loyalties, and identities, but children generally do not have the material
conditions (e.g., economic independence, physical maturity, and cognitive abil-
ity) to meet many of their own needs and desires. It is the adults who surround
them, help define them, and help identify and meet their needs, who we must
engage if we want to engage children. Moreover, it is those people-the
child's parents, extended family, fictive kin-who know the child best and who
the child knows best. Thus, engaging the people who are part of the child's
world might constitute representation that is "deeply respectful of the individu-
ality and unique perspective of the client."
' 136
4. Know but Question Authority
Fourth, just as finding and respecting children's voice means muting our
own voice, it also means taking a critical perspective on both our own and other
professionals' framing and assessment of the issues. One crucial piece of this
process requires identifying and exploring the perspectives-world views-of
our clients and their communities. This is not an easy task, but one which
requires deep and broad familiarity with our clients in their worlds. Entering
these worlds is difficult given our own limitations (e.g., case loads or teaching
loads) and our differences from our clients. Understanding and apprehending
these other perspectives is also difficult for it requires a level of intimacy and
trust between lawyer and client along with an ability to respect difference and
the truth of different perspectives.
A crucial piece in this critical perspective prescription is to identify our
own world views and recognize their contingency: that they are ours by training
and perspective, but are no more true or natural than the views of our clients.
We professionals are accustomed to, and good at, working within bureaucratic
systems and the conventions of our own disciplines. But as we know, various
professional disciplines' ways of ordering the world do not reflect various lay
world views. Any of us who work in the legal and social services systems are
all too familiar with the way that bureaucracies view the world: as funding
streams and pots of money. Services are accessible according to how they are
characterized to fit into state, county or federal categories. Too often, services
are not created or framed in terms that correspond to individual, family or com-
munity needs. To do our jobs, we must understand these bureaucratic boxes
and the conventions of our own and other disciplines; for example, we should
be able to use and appreciate psychological models and recognize the legal
questions. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that bureaucratic boxes
and our professional conventions do not necessarily correspond to the lived
lives of others, including our clients. If we aspire to making the legal and
social systems that purport to serve our clients intelligible and responsive to our
clients (and I think we should), we must be able to step out of the boxes in
136 Peters, supra note 126, at 1508.
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which we and our colleagues in other disciplines frame issues confronting
children.
The Bazelon Center's R.C. v. Hornsby litigation against Alabama's child
welfare system provides a glimpse of this type of approach. Utilizing a self-
described "bottom-up" method to child welfare reform,' 3 7 the lawyers and
expert consultants engaged the families and the line social workers to identify
and develop needed family supports.1 38 Indeed, rather than relying primarily
on federal funding statutes that frame the issues in terms of protection and the
solutions as foster care and regulation, Bazelon viewed the children as individ-
uals who were members of families and communities.1 39 This bottom-up
approach literally transformed the system and the people in it-case workers,
children, and parents-so that the line workers began to approach their role as
collaborating with families, viewing their positive features, and building on
their strengths;' 4 ° parents could understand risks to their children and take
responsibility for those risks and their solutions; 4 1 and the needs, experiences
and desires of children became central.' 42 Assistance to the children and fami-
lies (including foster families) were designed to meet their needs, in their
homes, and with the help of their communities, rather than the more dominant
bureaucratic template of psychological counseling and generic substance abuse
treatment at professional offices.' 4 3
With our training, wisdom and power, it is so tempting for lawyers to see
ourselves in the role of rescuer, particularly when we represent children. Chil-
dren are vulnerable and need protection from themselves or others who might
victimize or neglect them. Many of the children we represent are from families
subordinated through racial or economic status or from families disrupted and
disputing. It may feel natural for us to assume the role of protector when chil-
dren seem to be without the kinds of support systems we think are necessary
and appropriate. Such a vision, though, demeans the child and the very things
that have helped form the child's identity: parents, siblings, neighborhood,
community, cultural norms, race, ethnicity, gender, etc. Saving children under-
137 MAKING CHILD WELFARE WORK, supra note 22, at 1.
138 Id. at 29-36, 49. Lead attorney Ira Burnim even refused to phase in reform by services or
age of children; instead, he urged them to "'do the whole job right' for a specific group of
children [at a time]." Id. at 27.
139 Thus, Bazelon framed the legal question as "children's constitutional right to family
integrity-their right to be raised by their parents." Id. at 16.
140 Id. at 34-36.
141 Id. at 53-54.
142 Id. at 22 (listing five values of the settlement decree); id. at 27 (stating that settlement
included an "elaborate set of policies that gave children in out-of-home placements the right
to daily telephone and mail contact with family and friends" and frequent, unsupervised
visitation with family and friends); id. at 29 (describing individualized services for a child
based on her needs).
143 See id. at 51-70. See also Kathleen Kufeldt, Marie Simard, Paul Thomas & Jacques
Vachon, A Grass Roots Approach to Influencing Child Welfare Policy, 10 CHILD & FAM.
Soc. WORK 305 (2005) (describing approach to child welfare reform in Canada).
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mines their humanity and diminishes their ability to guide their attorneys in
identifying the problems and their solutions as the client sees them.
C. Representing Children in Families and Communities
I return here to the phenomenon of social movements I alluded to above.
There is an extensive legal and social science literature regarding social move-
ments."' Much of this literature is not pertinent here, but it contains some
lessons to help children's attorneys identify what organized, coordinated advo-
cacy is, what it means for children, and how our own advocacy may or may not
be grounded in the social conditions of children, their families and communi-
ties. A social movement is, in grossly simplified terms, an organized, collec-
tive, political action designed to press a claim and affect public opinion. 4 5
Social movements come in all shapes and sizes, and experts seem to define
them by their function or structure, not by their constituents or aims; social
movements need not be composed of those for whom the movement advocates.
Thus, social scientists have characterized the environmental and animal rights
movements as social movements even though the collective action is not under-
taken by, and the constituents are not, animals, streams or forests. 1 4 6 In fact,
social movements are increasingly comprised of professionals, rather than the
persons or groups on whose behalf the change is sought.' 4 7 In the context of
politically disempowered groups, lawyers may, in effect, compose the
movement. 1
48
It is not surprising then that social movements can be organized on behalf
of children but without children in leadership or membership roles. Indeed, in
4 E.g., MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS & THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVE-
MENT, 1960-1973 (1993); How SOCIAL MOVEMENTS MATTER (Marco Giugni, Doug
McAdam, & Charles Tilly eds., 1999); FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR
PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS: WHY THEY SUCCEED, How THEY FAIL (1977); CHARLES TILLY,
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, 1768-2004 (2004); WAVES OF PROTEST: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS SINCE
THE SIXTIES (Jo Freeman & Victoria Johnson eds., 1999) [hereinafter WAVES OF PROTEST];
WHO SPEAKS FOR AMERICA'S CHILDREN, supra note 108; Joseph Helfgot, Professional
Reform Organizations and the Symbolic Representation of the Poor, 39 AM. Soc. REV. 475
(1974), See also Brown-Nagin, supra note 43; Eskridge, supra note 43; Rubin, supra note 43
(each discussing social movements from a legal-centric perspective).
145 TILLY, supra note 144, at 3-4. Tilly provides this schematic definition of social move-
ments: "1) Campaigns of collective claims on target authorities; 2) an array of claim-making
performances including special-purpose associations, public meetings, media statements, and
demonstrations; 3) public representations of the case's worthiness, unity, numbers and com-
mitment." Id. at 7.
146 James M. Jasper, Recruiting Intimate, Recruiting Strangers: Building the Contemporary
Animal Rights Movement, in WAVES OF PROTEST, supra note 144, at 65-82; Luther P. Ger-
lach, The Structure of Social Movements: Environmental Activism and Its Opponents, in
WAVES OF PROTEST, supra note 144, at 85-97.
147 Skopcol & Dickert, supra note 108, at 144-45; Suzanne Staggenborg, Consequences of
Professionalization and Formalization in the Pro-Choice Movement, in WAVES OF PROTEST,
supra note 144, at 99.
48 See David L. Chambers & Michael S. Wald, Smith v. Offer, in MNOOKIN, supra note 47,
at 67, 75-78 (describing the origins of the New York Civil Liberties Union Children's Rights
Project which relied heavily on the attorneys to create and direct class actions on behalf of
children); Ziv, supra note 72, at 216-17 (describing the primary role lawyers played in craft-
ing and passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994)).
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the case of children, with a number of possible exceptions during the 1960s and
1970s, 149 social workers, lawyers and other adults have constituted children's
movements. '50 Today, it appears that discrete entities headed by professionals,
not children or their parents, constitute social movements on behalf of children.
There is no widespread, if any, grassroots movement for children.' Instead,
leading national organized advocacy on behalf of children consists of various
legal and judicial organizations, such as the American Bar Association's Chil-
dren's Law Center, Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, Children's Rights,
Inc., Juvenile Law Center, National Center for Youth Law, National Juvenile
Defender Center, National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, and
the Youth Law Center; and social policy organizations, such as the Children's
Defense Fund and the Parent Teacher Association.
All of these organizations engage in very high level, important, and in
some instances truly progressive work on behalf of children and their families.
They are not, however, community based or community driven. Like most
social movement organizations, children's advocacy groups have small, if any,
memberships' 52 so they are advocating for fewer people and are increasingly
removed from the people for whom they advocate. These advocacy groups are
the primary non-elected and non-appointed actors who develop public policy
through policy and litigation. Yet these groups are not comprised of the chil-
dren or parents of the children we generally represent. 153 These are not criti-
cisms at all, but instead are meant to point out our riches so that we can explore
what more it is that children might need to compliment the professionally
driven work.
Moreover, while law is increasing statutory and administrative in this
country, judges do still make and interpret law. Judges too can be-simply by
virtue of education and class-far from the worlds of our clients, so judicial
actions may not be receptive to the needs of children and their communities. In
addition, the roll-back of rights, particularly any sort of anti-subordination con-
tent to the equal protection doctrine, 5 4 has further limited courts' identification
with and responsiveness to our clients and their communities. As child advo-
cates we find ourselves in a game played by rules made by decision makers
who may have little connection to, or concern about, the children for whom we
advocate.
We may want to think then about our approaches to justice. This is not to
say that what we do for children as lawyers is not important and noble, but we
149 THE CHILDREN'S RIGHTS MOVEMENT (Beatrice Gross & Ronald Gross eds., 1977).
150 HAWES, supra note 47. Emmett D. Carson, Introduction: How Are the Children?, in
WHO SPEAKS FOR AMERICA'S CHILDREN, supra note 108, at xii-xiii.
151 Imig, supra note 108, at 191, 199.
152 See Skocpol & Dickert, supra note 108, at 147-49 (two-thirds of the associations formed
since the 1960s that have any sort of child or family focus have 1000 or less members).
153 Theda Skocpol notes that "[w]hat is missing is any sort of broad popularly rooted effort
of the sort that the nationwide women's associations of the early twentieth century were able
to mobilize. Child advocates find themselves relegated to lobbying Congress while writing
detailed informational reports and trying to attract media attention." THEDA SKOCPOL, LES-
SONS FROM HISTORY: BUILDING A MOVEMENT FOR AMERICA'S CHILDREN 13 (1997).
15, E.g, Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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may want to question how much we procedural justice lawyers are doing to
maintain and refine a series of laws that are elite and disconnected from the
lives of the children, families and communities who these laws primarily affect.
Similarly, we legal justice lawyers face limitations of doctrine and federal pol-
icy that affects what we can do at the local level and at a minimum may frame
the discourse in terms that are more bureaucratic than reflective of the lives of
our clients. Those of us who engage in social justice advocacy may be faced
with our own disconnection from communities or with the lack of resources
and support for community-based work.
While I do not suggest that we all can or should leave our practices or
move our offices into our clients' communities, I do suggest that we begin to
think and work as creatively and broadly as we can. We should not be content
with the traditional legal work we do for children and the types of relationships
we have with them. Instead we should consciously follow (and further
develop) the types of principles I outlined in the preceding section and chal-
lenge the systems that our clients tell us do not serve them in their families or in
their communities. We should also question ourselves when we seek to fit
clients into our legal strategies rather than use legal strategies that fit our cli-
ents. We should further do what we can to bring children's voice to the discus-
sion of child and family policy at every level to which we have access.
We might even think of other ways to serve children. We need to be
guided by children, and not just professionals (including ourselves). Given the
limitations of children's voice and the limited efficacy of children's litigation
and policy advocacy on improving justice for children, maybe we should be
representing, or supporting organizing efforts of, parents and communities-
those who have stronger voices and can guide us more clearly. Despite the
rhetorical appeal of advocating for children, it can have an effect of isolating
children and their needs from their families and communities. In our current
political and social environment that perceives problems and solutions as mat-
ters of individual will, we might revisit the individuating affects of child-based
advocacy and instead explore more comprehensive advocacy for children in
their families and communities-perhaps even thinking in grass-roots social
movement terms. After all, mobilization for children that culminated in the
well-known social and legal reforms and Progressive federal policies for chil-
dren in the first half of the twentieth century were part of broader nationwide
social movements of protest and concern for children. 5 5 These advances grew
out of and with the support of community networks. 15 6 It is not surprising then
that we are seeing some of the more concrete and progressive, if localized,
reforms that promote children's health and welfare arising out of the commu-
155 Imig, supra note 108, at 192-93, 195; SKOCPOL, supra note 153, at 10-11. This is not to
suggest that the Progressive Era reforms were not without significant problems related to
devaluing, and subordinating, non-dominant families. See Appell, supra note 16, at 156-61
(describing Anglo-supremacist history of efforts designed to protect children); Dorothy E.
Roberts, Welfare and the Problem of Black Citizenship, 105 YALE L.J. 1563 (1996) (analyz-
ing the gendered and racist norms that limited Progressive and New Deal reforms).
156 Imig, supra note 108 at 193; Skocpol & Dickert, supra note 108; SKOCPOL, supra note
153.
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nity or community development organizations.' 57 These promising initiatives,
like those of the past,1 58 engage parents, promote collective identities of com-
munity members, and collaborate with social service agencies and schools to
meet the needs of families. 59 This connection between children, parents, and
communities recognizes that families and communities are in the best position
to understand and mobilize resources for children.
Indeed, political scientist Theda Skocpol advocates a new social move-
ment for children that would unite families across class and cultural divides.' 60
This "Parents First" approach recognizes that it is the adults connected to chil-
dren who can best achieve social change and identifies a unifying theme that
"the work of parents and supportive communities in nurturing children consti-
tutes a vital service." 161 For what unites so many families in this country is the
lack of social and economic support for rearing children: a living wage, health
insurance, paid family leave, safe schools and playgrounds, and leisure time for
connecting with family and community.
1 62
IV. CONCLUSION
The Fordham Children's Conference brought some clarity and some unity
to the world of child representation. That clarity was one of vision and role,
but one that did not remove, and should not have removed, the messiness and
complications in representing children. This UNLV Children's Conference was
intended to mess things up in a way that might help move us to the next steps:
to identify habits through which we can overcome the difficulties in identifying
children's voice and suppressing the hegemony of the lawyer and other profes-
sionals; to recognize and address the tendency for us to do violence in "translat-
ing" our clients' wishes; and to find a model for including parents and
communities.
The past half century has seen tremendous strides in the legal status of
children and an accompanying creation of, and rise in, the children's bar. Dur-
ing the latter part of this period though, overall children have become poorer,
157 See Garcia et al., supra note 93 (describing community organizing for public parks in
economically blighted urban neighborhood); Imig, supra note 108, at 201, 204 (listing orga-
nizations that "mobilize parents and communities on behalf of children"); Skocpol & Dic-
kert, supra note 108, at 159-61 (describing the Texas Industrial Areas Foundation methods
of engaging community members to advocate locally for programs and policies to aid chil-
dren and families).
158 See SKOCPOL, supra note 153, at 11-12 (describing and attributing success to the Pro-
gressive Era movements to mutually engaged professionals and grass-roots women's
federations).
159 Imig, supra note 108, at 201-03; see also ANNELISE ORLECK, STORMING CAESARS PAL-
ACE 93-97, 102-03 (2005) (noting that the needs of their children motivated and united the
mothers who formed the remarkable Clark County Welfare Rights Organization); Nancy A.
Naples, Activist Mothering: Cross-Generational Continuity in the Community Work of
Women from Low-Income Urban Neighborhoods, 6 GENDER & Soc'Y 441, 448 (1992)
(many women come to community work in response to concerns regarding their children's
environment); COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND FAMILY SUPPORT, supra note 108, at 12-20
(describing principles for effective family-based community development).
160 SKOCPOL, supra note 153, at 14-16.
161 Id. at 15.
162 Id.
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their opportunities have narrowed, and they are growing up in an era of zero
tolerance and zero forgiveness for their youthful actions. At the same time, our
legal landscape has changed drastically. We are no longer in an era of
expanding civil rights and liberty. The polity is less democratic in terms of
citizen voting power and engagement, and the policy makers are more profes-
sionalized and less representative of the people.' 63 As those who work with or
on behalf of our youth, we should take steps to position ourselves, when and if
we can, to develop creative ways to promote children and youth on their terms.
To do that, we must engage their families and communities because children,
even more than adults, are not islands and cannot thrive unless they and those
with whom they identify have what they need. We must engage their families
and communities because many of us are not them; most of us are professionals
and our knowledge of what is best is limited to our training.
163 See Lawrence R. Jacobs & Theda Skocpol, American Democracy in an Era of Rising
Inequality, in INEQUALITY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, WHAT WE KNOW AND WHAT WE
NEED TO LEARN I (Lawrence R. Jacobs & Theda Skocpol eds., 2005).
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